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Previous studies examining memory biases for threatening faces in social anxiety (SA) have 
yielded inconclusive results. In the present study, memory and expectancy biases were tested 
within the context of a novel face recognition paradigm that was designed to offset some of the 
methodological challenges that have hampered previous research. Undergraduates with high  
(n = 40) and low (n = 40) levels of SA viewed a series of neutral faces randomly paired with 
phrases that communicated positive or negative social feedback. Participants‘ recognition 
memory was tested for previously encountered faces, and for their categorization of each 
encoded face as having been associated with negative (mean) or positive (nice) interpersonal 
statements. For faces labelled as new, participants were asked whether the person depicted 
seemed mean or nice. Results provided no evidence in support of a general memory bias for 
threatening (mean) faces among high SA individuals, but instead suggested that high SA 
individuals lack a positive expectancy bias to appraise new social partners as being nice. 
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Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most prevalent psychological disorders, with 
a lifetime prevalence rate of approximately 12% (Kessler et al., 2005). SAD is characterised by 
fear of one or more social situations that are avoided entirely or endured with high levels of 
distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Individuals with SAD experience significant 
difficulties related to their anxiety symptoms across several life domains, including school and 
work, social and romantic relationships, and overall quality of life (Stein & Kean, 2000).   
Due to the high prevalence of SAD and its impairing consequences, much research has 
focused on understanding the cognitive factors that may account for the development and 
persistence of social anxiety symptoms. Cognitive models of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) have attempted to elucidate the underlying cognitive 
mechanisms involved in the maintenance of symptoms. According to these models, individuals 
with high levels of social anxiety (SA) attach ―fundamental importance to being positively 
appraised by others‖ (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997, p. 742) but believe that other people are 
inherently critical. During a social situation, socially anxious individuals form and maintain 
moment-by-moment negative mental representations of themselves, as seen from the vantage 
point of their imagined critical evaluators (Clark & McManus, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
High SA individuals also perceive others as having exceedingly high standards for their social 
performance, and believe that they lack the skills necessary to live up to these standards, due to 
perceived flaws in self-relevant attributes that they worry will be revealed over the course of the 
social interaction (e.g., Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Moscovitch, 2009). Interestingly, there 
has not been consistent empirical support for the idea that high SA individuals have objective 
social skill deficits, with most research suggesting instead that they are inhibited in applying 
skills that they do possess in social contexts (Hofmann, 2007). It has been hypothesized that 
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reluctance to utilize these skills may also be due, in part, to their high estimation of the social 
costs of acting inappropriately or committing a social blunder (Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Thus, it has been suggested that high SA individuals view negative social 
outcomes as both catastrophic and likely due to these perceived shortcomings, and become 
hypervigilant toward social cues signifying potential negative evaluation (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997). 
Efforts in recent years to test the prominent theoretical claims of these cognitive models 
of SA have led to the rapid growth of an extensive body of research supporting the notion that 
SA is associated with attention biases toward threatening information (e.g., Buckner, Maner & 
Schmidt, 2010; Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004). 
Research focused on attentional biases toward threatening information (most commonly, faces) 
has most often used measures of the latency to orient toward threat within the context of the dot-
probe (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002) or face-in-the-crowd paradigms (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman et 
al., 1999). Of these studies, many have found that individuals with higher levels of SA were 
quicker to orient toward faces with negative expressions (e.g., anger, disgust) than were non-
anxious controls (Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Mogg et al., 2004; Pishyar et al., 2004; Stevens, Rist, 
& Gerlach, 2009). An additional attentional mechanism that has recently been implicated in SA 
is difficulty disengaging from threatening faces. For example, Buckner, Maner, and Schmidt 
(2010) studied visual attention using eye-tracking and found that when presented with a series of 
happy and disgusted faces, individuals with high SA had difficulty disengaging visual attention 
from the disgusted faces, but did not differ from non-anxious controls in their ability to 
disengage from happy faces.  
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Interestingly, attentional biases to threat have recently become targets of a specialized 
computer-based treatment protocol, attention retraining, which is designed to reduce or eliminate 
these biases and, in turn, to reduce symptoms of social anxiety. Several studies have found 
evidence to suggest that this training may be able to ameliorate symptoms of anxiety and 
improve social performance. For example, in a randomized controlled trial, Amir and colleagues 
(2009) used probe-detection tasks to train patients with SAD to direct attention toward neutral 
and away from threatening faces, and found that attention training significantly reduced social 
anxiety symptoms post-treatment relative to individuals who participated in a control probe-
detection task, with gains preserved in the attention training group at four-month follow-up 
(Amir et al., 2009). Other studies have found that, in addition to reducing SA symptoms, 
attention training away from threat also improves speech performance in socially anxious 
individuals (Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008).   
Thus, there is relatively strong empirical support for the notion that attentional biases 
exist in SA, and the evidence suggests that these biases play an important role in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms. Conversely, research on memory biases for 
threatening information in SA has been relatively sparse and findings have been inconsistent 
across different methodological approaches, in which the nature of the threat stimuli used (e.g., 
faces, words, etc.) and the type of memory tested (e.g., recall, recognition, implicit memory, 
autobiographical memory) have varied greatly. For example, many studies using threatening 
words have failed to find a memory bias (Cloitre, Cancienne, Heimberg, Holt, & Liebowitz, 
1995; Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, & Rodney, 1994), whereas others that have used 
sentences or passages related to social threat have found memory biases, some of which showed 
enhanced memory for socially anxious participants (e.g., Amir, Coles, & Foa, 2000), and others 
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demonstrating enhanced memory for non-anxious participants (e.g., Wenzel, Jackson, & Holt, 
2002).  
It has been argued that verbal stimuli in studies of information processing biases in SA 
may be less effective in eliciting fear of social evaluation relative to face stimuli, and may thus 
have limited ecological validity (e.g., Pishyar et al., 2004). Indeed, for this reason, the use of 
faces as social threat stimuli has become popular in contemporary research on this topic (Coles 
& Heimberg, 2005; Foa, Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & Freshman, 2000; Lundh & Öst, 1996; 
Pérez-López & Woody, 2001). However, results of studies examining face memory biases in 
socially anxious participants have also been mixed (for a review of this literature, see Staugaard, 
2010). For instance, several studies have failed to find any differences in the recognition and 
recall of threatening faces between control participants and both clinical and analog samples of 
participants with high levels of SA (Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002; D'Argembeau, Van 
der Linden, Etienne, & Comblain, 2003; Hunter, Buckner, & Schmidt, 2009; Mansell, Clark, 
Ehlers, & Chen, 1999; Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & Workman, 2006). A limited 
number of recent studies have found differences in memory between participants high and low in 
SA, but there still is considerable disagreement related to the nature of these differences. For 
example, in a study comprising two experiments, Foa et al. (2000) found, first, that participants 
with SAD demonstrated better overall memory for facial expressions than did controls, and 
second, that individuals with SAD also recognized more negative than positive faces—a 
difference not evident in the control group. Conversely, Pérez-López and Woody (2001) found 
that participants with SAD demonstrated significantly poorer memory for facial expressions than 
did healthy controls while anticipating a speech.  
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Some researchers have attempted to reduce the focus on generic threat stimuli (e.g., 
negative faces) in favor of incorporating personally-relevant threatening information into studies 
of face processing biases in SA. In a seminal study by Lundh and Öst (1996), participants with 
SAD and non-anxious controls were exposed to a series of neutral faces and asked to rate each of 
them as being either critical or accepting before subsequently engaging in a recognition task for 
previously labelled and novel faces. Individuals with SAD were more likely to categorize those 
faces that they labelled as being critical as having been previously encountered, whereas controls 
exhibited the opposite type of bias. A follow-up study by Coles and Heimberg (2005) replicated 
these findings, but also extended Lundh and Öst‘s (1996) original study by obtaining external 
ratings (from a different set of participants) of the face stimuli as being accepting or critical. 
Using these ratings, Coles and Heimberg demonstrated that the difference between participants 
with and without SAD was more likely reflective of a response bias than of a bona fide memory 
bias. Specifically, their findings suggested that rather than the two groups differing in their 
recognition accuracy for threatening faces, which would indicate a true memory bias, they 
differed instead in the ways that they responded to faces perceived as critical versus accepting, 
regardless of whether they were seen before. Thus, they argued that this group difference is more 
accurately conceptualized as a response bias for faces with various characteristics (i.e., seeming 
critical or accepting), rather than as a memory accuracy bias. In particular, Coles and Heimberg 
(2005) found that non-anxious controls tended to categorize accepting faces (both old and new) 
as having been previously seen, whereas individuals SAD trended toward categorizing critical 
faces (both old and new) as having been previously seen.  
Another recent study examined the impact of personally relevant threat on memory for 
social information among groups of high and low SA participants (Cody & Teachman, 2010). 
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Participants in both groups delivered a laboratory-based speech, and received standardized 
feedback both on their own speech performance and on that of a confederate. Results indicated 
that, relative to low SA participants, high SA individuals remembered the feedback that they 
received as being more negative and the feedback that confederates received as being more 
positive, suggesting a bias among high SA individuals for remembering negative self-relevant 
social information. However, because this study used standardized feedback across participants, 
researchers were not able to examine whether and how participants‘ own idiosyncratic self-
relevant concerns might have played a role in affecting their memory performance.  
Thus, preliminary evidence supports the notion that memory biases may emerge among high SA 
individuals for personally threatening social information, but additional studies are needed to 
further investigate this claim, and to elucidate the cognitive processes involved.  
 The present study examines memory and expectancy biases in the processing of 
personally relevant social threat among high and low SA participants using a novel face–phrase 
association paradigm adapted from research in the emerging field of social neuroscience 
(Todorov, Gobbini, Evans, & Haxby, 2009). In this paradigm, objectively neutral faces are 
paired with socially threatening (negative: critical) and non-threatening (positive: accepting) 
phrases, and presented to participants one at a time. Following encoding, participants‘ 
recognition and recall are tested for faces, their associated valence, and the phrases themselves. 
This study seeks to counteract two methodological concerns about the approaches previously 
used to address face memory biases in SA. First, the vast majority of previous studies have used 
face stimuli with objectively valenced (e.g., angry) facial expressions. Such stimuli are 
inherently more distinctive and memorable than neutral faces, implying that attentional shift 
toward or superior memory for these faces may not reflect a threat bias per se, but rather a 
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natural preference for unusual stimuli (e.g., Hunt & Lamb, 2001). Moreover, objectively 
valenced threat such as negative facial expressions is likely to elicit a variety of subjective 
interpretations from participants, such that each type of expression may be meaningful to each 
participant for different reasons (e.g., viewing a disgusted face may be associated for one 
participant with the thought, ―He thinks that I am ugly,‖ and for another person with the thought, 
―He thinks that I am incompetent,‖ and so on). Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere (e.g., 
Moscovitch, 2009), high SA individuals are fundamentally concerned about revealing perceived 
flaws in social behaviours, signs of anxiety, and physical appearance, but the nature and strength 
of specific self-portrayal concerns tend to vary idiosyncratically across people (Moscovitch & 
Huyder, 2011). Because negative facial expressions might trigger heterogeneous subjective 
interpretations depending upon each participant‘s specific self-portrayal concerns, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for researchers whose studies successfully detect information processing biases 
among high SA individuals in response to viewing such faces to determine why, exactly, this 
might be occurring. Thus, by using neutral faces that are valenced by virtue of their pairings with 
explicitly negative or positive social feedback, the paradigm we used in the present study was 
designed explicitly to control both for potential response bias associated with the elevated 
distinctiveness of valenced faces, and for the interpretations that participants might make in 
response to the faces they view. In addition, by virtue of embedding a series of new faces within 
the recognition phase and examining the pattern of high versus low SA participants‘ responding 
to these unfamiliar faces as threatening (―mean‖) or non-threatening (―nice‖), our study is unique 
in being able to investigate both the potential presence of a memory bias towards previously-
encountered threat, and the potential presence of response and/or expectancy biases towards 





Several standardized prescreening questionnaires, including the Social Phobia Inventory 
(SPIN; Connor et al., 2000), were administered to all potentially eligible participants in the 
undergraduate Psychology research pool at the University of Waterloo in Canada. High and low 
SA individuals from that pool were invited to participate if their scores on the SPIN met a cutoff 
of above 30 or below 12, respectively (see Additional measures, below). Eighty individuals (40 
high and 40 low in SA) were recruited to participate in the present study. All participants 


















Development and selection of experimental stimuli. Fifty-four neutral Caucasian and 
Asian faces were selected from the NIMSTIM standardized face set (Tottenham et al., 2009) and 
the Japanese and Caucasian Neutral Faces standardized face set (JACNeuF; Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 1988). Given the large minority of students within the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate participant pool who typically identify their ethnic background as being Asian 
(with the majority typically identifying themselves as Caucasian), approximately 40% of the 
faces selected were Asian, and 60% were Caucasian. All faces were presented on a white 
background, and were sized to 300 x 400 (±10) pixels. Thirty-six faces were randomly assigned 
to three face-phrase association sets of 12 faces each. Each set was equally divided into males 
and females, and within each gender, 40% were Asian faces. During the recognition phase of the 
study, an additional 18 faces (six in each set) were presented, maintaining the aforementioned 
proportions of gender and ethnicity within each set. The order of face presentation in both the 
encoding and retrieval phases was randomized across participants.  
Fifty-four phrases (half positively valenced, half negatively valenced) were developed as 
pairings for the faces. The negative phrases were based on items from the Negative Self-
Portrayal Scale (NSPS; Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011). As described below (see Additional 
measures), the NSPS evaluates concerns related to displaying self-perceived flaws related to: (a) 
social competence, (b) signs of anxiety, and (c) physical appearance. The positive phrases were 
designed to mirror the negative ones. Prior to using the stimuli in the present study, we 
completed a pilot study, in which all phrases were rated for valence and memorability by a 
sample of 19 pilot participants, who were asked to rate the valence of each phrase on a 7-point 
scale (-3 = very negative; 0 = neutral; 3 = very positive). All ratings conformed to a priori 
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groupings, with a mean rating of 1.83 (SD = .41) for positive phrases, and -1.60 (SD = .72) for 
negative phrases. Outlier analysis was conducted for both valences and there were no outliers. 
Following the rating task, pilot participants were confronted with an unexpected free recall task 
in which they were asked to recall as many of the previously presented phrases as possible. The 
number of times each word was recalled across participants was divided by the total number of 
participants (n = 19) to obtain the memorability proportion score for each word. Positively-
valenced phrases obtained a mean memorability score of .24 (SD = .20), and negatively-valenced 
phrases a mean of .20 (SD = .17). Outlier analysis was conducted for both valences, and two 
words (―fat‖ and ―attractive‖) were excluded as outliers.  The authors selected 36 of the 
remaining 52 phrases for the study. These phrases were selected because they were judged as 
being most representative of each NSPS domain. The complete list of phrases and their 













Social threat induction. Previous studies have shown that information processing biases 
may emerge among high SA individuals only under conditions of social threat (e.g. Leber, 
Heidenreich, Stangier, & Hofmann, 2009). Thus, prior to the computer tasks, participants were 
instructed to anticipate giving a short speech that would occur at the end of the study session. 
Specifically, the experimenter delivered the following script as part of the instructions to all 
participants at the start of the experiment:  ―You will first complete three tasks on the computer. 
Following the computer tasks, you will be asked to give a short speech. Another researcher will 
come in and rate your speech performance and their first impressions of you. I will give you 
















Valence, arousal, and distress ratings. As a manipulation check for the social threat 
induction, immediately before and after the induction, participants were asked to rate their 
current level of anxiety on a subjective units of distress (SUDS) scale from 0 to 100. In addition, 
using the Self Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994), participants rated their 
arousal level and the valence of their emotional state on a 9-point scale (1 = low arousal and 



















Additional measures. All participants completed the following self-report measures 
immediately after the administration of the computer tasks: 
The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) is a 17-item self-report 
instrument that measures fear, avoidance, and physiological discomfort in social situations (e.g., 
fear of people in authority; avoids parties; distressed by sweating). Each item is rated on a scale 
from 0 (―not at all‖) to 4 (―extremely‖), with higher scores representing greater levels of distress; 
thus, the full scale score ranges from 0 to 68. The SPIN has been shown to be an excellent 
measure of social anxiety, with good test-retest reliability, strong convergent and divergent 
validity, good construct validity, and high levels of internal consistency (Antony, Coons, 
McCabe, Ashbaugh, & Swinson,  2006; Connor et al., 2000). Although Connor and colleagues 
(2000) proposed a cut-off score of 19 and higher to select participants likely to have social 
anxiety disorder, we followed the suggestion of others (e.g., Moser, Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & 
Simons, 2008) who have expressed a preference for using a more stringent cut-off score of 30. 
We selected a cut-off score of 12 or below for controls because Connor et al. (2000) reported that 
their non-psychiatric control group had a mean SPIN total score of 12.1. This cut-off score 
resembles the score of 10 or below that has been used by Moser et al. (2008) to identify low 
anxious controls. The reliability (internal consistency) of the SPIN total score in the present 
study was estimated using Cronbach‘s alpha, and was .93. 
The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report measure divided into three subscales designed to 
assess anxiety, depression, and stress. It is a condensed version of the DASS-41 (Lovibond &  
Lovibond, 1995), a commonly-used measure of these three constructs. The Depression Scale 
assesses dysphoric mood states, including self-deprecation, lack of interest/ involvement, 
hopelessness, and anhedonia. The Anxiety Scale assesses arousal states, including autonomic 
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arousal, muscular tension, and anxious affect. Finally, the Stress Scale is reported to assess 
negative emotional reactions to stressors as well as general tension. The reliabilities (internal 
consistencies) of the DASS-21 Anxiety, Depression, Stress, and Total Scales in the present study 
were estimated using Cronbach‘s alpha, and were .86 for the Depression Scale, .79 for the 
Anxiety Scale, .85 for the Stress Scale, and .92 for the Total Scale.  
The NSPS (Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011) is a newly-developed questionnaire designed to 
assess participant concerns that specific self-attributes that they view as flawed or deficient will 
be exposed to scrutiny and evaluation by critical others in social situations. Across two large 
samples of North American undergraduate students with normally distributed symptoms of 
social anxiety, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses supported a (non-orthogonal) 3-
factor solution representing concerns about (a) social competence, (b) physical appearance, and 
(c) signs of anxiety (Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011). The scale demonstrated good internal 
consistency (α =.95 for full scale and α =.87-.92 for the 3 subscales) and test-retest reliability (r 
=.75). The NSPS also demonstrated adequate convergent and discriminant validity (r =.63-.70 
with symptom measures of social anxiety and r =.47-.62 with measures of OCD and depression). 
Crohnbach‘s alpha coefficients for the NSPS in the present study were .90 for the social 
competence subscale, .83 for the signs of anxiety subscale, .91 for the physical appearance 









Face learning and recognition tasks. For the duration of the study, participants were 
seated alone in a room at a computer desk on which a 22-inch monitor was mounted. The 
experimenter left the room after delivering the instructions and allowing participants to ask any 
clarifying questions. The experimenter entered the room following each learning-recognition set 
to set up the next part of the experiment on the computer. As shown in Figure 1, during the 
encoding task, participants were presented with three sets of 12 face-phrase pairs (six ‗mean‘ and 
six ‗nice‘; see below) for a total of 36 face-phrase associates. Prior to each face, a blank screen 
appeared for 1000 ms, followed by a fixation cross, which appeared for 500 ms. Following the 
fixation cross, an image of a neutral face appeared centered on the computer screen. Each face 
appeared simultaneously with a phrase immediately below it, which was typed in Courier font 
size 14. Each phrase consisted of the target word(s) (Appendix E) preceded by the word stem ―I 
can see that you are/have…‖ Each face-phrase pair was presented for 5000 ms. Participants were 
asked to label each face as ‗mean‘ or ‘nice‘, a rating made using the ―M‖ and ―N‖ keyboard 
keys. Participants were also instructed to try and remember who was mean and who was nice for 
later in the study.  
The recognition phase was comprised of three sets of 18 faces, and each set immediately 
followed an encoding phase. In each recognition set, participants viewed three sets of 18 faces, 
12 of which were presented in the encoding task (‗old‘ faces), as well as 6 faces not previously 
encountered (‗new‘ faces). Participants were instructed to indicate whether they recognized the 
face from the learning phase by pressing ‗‖O‖ for ‗old‘ and ‗‖N‖ for ‗new‘. For faces labelled as 
‗old‘, participants were then asked to indicate whether the face was mean or nice (previously 
associated with a mean or nice comment) by pressing ―M‖ for ‘mean‘ and ―N‖ for ‗nice‘. For 
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faces labelled as new, participants were asked to indicate whether the person seemed mean or 
nice, also by pressing ―M‖ or ―N‖, respectively. Participants had unlimited time to complete 
these ratings as accurately as they could. Participants were prohibited from backtracking to 
correct any perceived response errors.  
Immediately after each encoding and recognition set, participants completed the recall 
phase, in which they were asked to write down as many of the phrases from the preceding set as 
they could recall. The stem ―I can see that‖ was provided, followed by 36 blank lines for 
participants to complete. Following the recall task, participants were debriefed and compensated 
for their participation. 
                                           
 





Figure 1. Participants encountered a total of 36 face-phrase pairs. Each pair was presented for 
5000 ms. Between pairs, participants viewed a blank screen for 1000 ms, followed by a fixation 







I can see that you 
are tense 




 Preparation of data and analytic procedure. In preparation for analysis, responses for 
each participant across the 54 trials were organized into different categories according to: (a) 
whether the face encountered was actually old or new, (b) whether the face was categorized as 
being old or new, (c) whether the face (if old) was previously associated with a nice or mean 
comment, and (d) whether the associated valence was correctly identified,  thus yielding various 
combinations of hits and misses for both the initial old/new and subsequent mean/nice decisions 
(e.g., old faces correctly categorized as being old and correctly labelled as mean/nice, old faces 
incorrectly categorized as being new and correctly labelled as mean/nice, new faces correctly 
categorized as being new and then labelled as mean/nice, etc.). These combinations represent 
various important distinctions in how faces were encoded and recalled. The number of times that 
each participant labelled a face in each way was tallied across trials, and the mean tallies for high 















Preliminary Analyses  
Descriptive group characteristics. Descriptive characteristics of participants in both 
groups are presented in Table 1. Groups did not differ significantly in age, t(74) = 1.35, p = .18, 
or gender composition, X
2
(1) = 0.0, p = 1.00. Groups did differ on ethnic composition 
(Caucasian, Asian, Other), X
2
(2) = 10.03, p < .01, with a higher proportion of Asian participants 
represented in the high SA group. To examine the role of ethnicity in our findings, we repeated 
the primary analyses with ethnicity entered as a covariate (see Footnote 1). 
As displayed in Table 2, high and low SA participants differed significantly in the 
expected direction across the self-report measures, including the SPIN, DASS, and NSPS (all ts 
> 3.99, all ps < .001).  
Table 1 
Characteristics of Participant Groups  
 Low SA 
(n = 40) 
High SA 
 (n = 40) 
 





Gender (% female)  62.5% 62.5% 
Ethnicity 
   Caucasian 












Comparison of Participant Group Scores on Self-Report Measures  




















t(77) = 4.00* 
t(65) = 6.18* 
t(76) = 5.86* 
NSPS Total 
   Social competence 
   Signs of anxiety 









t(77) = 6.17* 
t(66) = 6.40* 
t(77) = 4.88* 
t(77) = 4.14* 
 
Note. Differences in degrees of freedom across t-tests reflect differences in missing values across 
measures; SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; DASS = Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale, 












Subjective Distress Prior to and Following Social Threat Induction 
 High relative to low SA participants provided higher SUDS and SAM ratings (valence 
and arousal) prior to and following the social threat induction (all ts > 2.43, all ps < .02). Pre-to-
post changes in SUDS and SAM ratings were examined across the two groups in three separate 2 
x 2 mixed-design analyses of variance (ANOVA). For each analysis, the between-subjects 
variable was group (low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects variable was SUDS or SAM 
ratings across the two assessment points (pre-induction vs. post-induction). As expected, there 
were significant or marginally significant main effects of time for SUDS and SAM arousal and 
valence ratings, indicating that across both anxiety groups, the threat induction resulted in 
significant or near-significant increases in SUDS (distress), and SAM valence and arousal ratings 
(all Fs > 3.45, ps <.07, partial 
2
s  > .04). A marginally significant group by time interaction 
emerged for the SUDS ratings, F(1,78) = 2.93, p = .09, partial 
2
 = .04, indicating that the high 
SA group experienced a higher increase in perceived distress after the threat induction. There 
were no significant group by time interactions for SAM arousal or valence ratings (Fs < 1.17, ps 
> .28, partial 
2












Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to examine group differences in accuracy. 
The two groups did not differ in their rates of correctly categorizing old faces as being old, t(78) 
=.16, p =.87. For rates of correctly categorizing novel faces as being new, a significant group 
difference emerged, with high SA participants showing enhanced recognition of novel faces 
overall relative to low SA participants, t(78) = 2.60, p =.01, indicating that high SA participants 
were more accurate at identifying faces they had not previously encountered. Finally, the two 
groups did not differ in their rates of correctly labeling previously-seen faces as being mean, 

















Recognition Memory for Mean and Nice Faces: Old vs. New Decision 
 A 2 x 2 mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the 
effects of group (between-subjects variable: low vs. high SA) and encoding valence (within-
subjects variable: mean vs. nice) on the number of old faces correctly identified as being old  
(i.e., hits). There were no significant main or interaction effects (all Fs ≤ 2.04, all ps ≥ .15, all 
partial 
2
s < .03), indicating that there was no memory bias to better recognize faces 
accompanied by mean or nice phrases in high versus low SA participants. Results are displayed 


















Recognition Memory:  Mean vs. Nice Decision for Remembered Faces 
A series of mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted. First, we examined the number of 
correct mean vs. nice decisions for old faces that were correctly recognized as old (i.e., hits). The 
between-subjects variable was group (low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects variable was 
number of correct valence labels (2 levels: number of mean faces labelled as being mean and 
number of nice faces labelled as being nice). Results indicated a main effect of valence, whereby 
more previously seen nice faces were labelled as such, F(1,78) = 5.44, p = .02, partial 
2
 = .07. 
However, there was no significant group by valence interaction, indicating no bias for 
remembering the valence of threatening faces among high relative to low SA participants, 
F(1,78) = 1.72, p = .19, partial 
2
 = .02.  
Second, we examined the number of incorrect mean vs. nice decisions for old faces that 
were hits. The between-subjects variable was group (low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects 
variable was number of incorrect valence labels (2 levels: number of mean faces labelled as 
being nice and number of nice faces labelled as being mean). Results indicated no significant 
effects (all Fs ≤ 1.68, all ps ≥ .20, all partial 
2
s ≤ .02).  
Last, we examined the number of mean vs. nice responses for novel faces that were 
incorrectly categorized as being old (i.e., false alarms). The between-subjects variable was group 
(low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects variable was number of mean vs. nice responses  
(2 levels: number of faces labelled as being mean and number of faces labelled as being nice). 
Results indicated no significant effects (all Fs ≤ 2.17, all ps ≥ .14, all partial 
2






Mean vs. Nice Labels for Faces Categorized as Being New 
 A series of mixed-design ANOVAs was conducted to examine mean versus nice labels 
for faces that were categorized as being new. The first ANOVA examined the effects of group on 
mean vs. nice responses for novel faces that were correctly labelled as being new (i.e., not 
previously encountered). The between-subjects variable was group (low vs. high SA) and the 
within-subjects variable was number of mean vs. nice responses (2 levels: number of faces 
labelled as being mean and number of faces labelled as being nice). Results revealed a significant 
effect of valence, F(1,78) = 5.21, p = .03, partial 
2
 = .06, as well as a significant group by 
valence interaction, F(1,78) = 15.26, p < .001, partial 
2
 = .16. A series of follow-up paired and 
independent-samples t-tests were conducted to further examine the nature of the significant 
interaction. These indicated that low SA participants labelled fewer new faces as being mean 
than nice, t(79) = 2.11, p < .001, and that high SA participants labelled more faces than low SA 
participants as being mean, t(78) = 4.52, p < .001 and fewer faces than low SA participants as 
being nice, t(78) = 2.10, p = .04. Proportions of new faces labelled mean and nice were 
computed for each group by dividing the mean numbers of faces labelled mean vs. nice by the 
total numbers of new faces correctly labelled as new in each group. ANOVA analyses were 
repeated and the overall pattern of results remained unchanged, with a main effect of valence 
emerging, F(1,78) = 7.26, p < .01, partial 
2
 = .09, as well as a significant group by valence 
interaction, F(1,78) = 14.32, p < .001, partial 
2





Figure 2. Proportions of correctly-identified new faces subsequently labelled as mean vs. nice. A 
group-by-valence interaction indicated that low SA participants were less likely to label new 
faces as being mean than nice, while high SA did not differ in their proportion of labels across 
the two categories. High SA participants were also more likely than low SA participants to label 
new faces as being mean and less likely than low SA participants to label new faces as being 























Table 3  
Mean Number of Faces Labelled as Being Mean or Nice Across Groups  














     
Old Faces Labelled Old 
 Mean labelled Mean 
 Nice labelled Nice 
 Nice labelled Mean 
 Mean labelled Nice 
New Faces Labelled Old 
 Mean 
 Nice 
Old Faces Labelled New 
 Mean labelled Mean 
 Nice labelled Nice 
 Nice labelled Mean 
 Mean labelled Nice 




























            








      




















  < 0.001 
 







The second ANOVA examined the effect of group on the number of correct mean vs. 
nice responses for old faces that were incorrectly labelled as being new (i.e., old faces that had 
been previously seen but were subsequently forgotten). The between-subjects variable was group 
(low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects variable was number of correct valence labels (2 
levels: number of mean faces labelled as being mean and number of nice faces labelled as being 
nice). There were no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.27, all ps > .1, all partial 
2
s < .03). 
The last ANOVA examined the effects of group on the number of incorrect mean vs. nice 
responses for old faces that were incorrectly labelled as being new. The between-subjects 
variable was group (low vs. high SA) and the within-subjects variable was number of incorrect 
valence labels (2 levels: number of mean faces labelled as being nice and number of nice faces 
labelled as being mean). Results revealed a main effect of valence, F(1,78) = 7.02, p = .01, 
partial 
2
 = .08, and a marginally significant group by valence interaction, F(1,78) = 3.53,  
p = .06, partial 
2
 = .04. A series of follow-up paired and independent-samples t-tests were 
conducted to further examine the nature of the marginally significant interaction. Paired-samples 
t-tests indicated that low SA participants were more likely to label mean faces erroneously as 
being nice than nice faces erroneously as being mean t(79) = 3.01, p < .001. No other 








Recall Memory and Subjective Domains of Concern 
 An additional aim of the present study was to examine whether participants‘ idiosyncratic 
social concerns were associated with specific memory biases for threatening phrases relevant to 
particular participants‘ self-portrayal concerns. A series of bivariate correlations was conducted 
including all 80 participants collapsed across both groups. Correlations were computed between 
the three NSPS subscale scores representing the three dimensions of concerns, namely: (a) signs 
of anxiety, (b) social competence, and (c) physical appearance, and the total number of freely 
recalled positive and negative phrases related to these domains. NSPS signs of anxiety scores 
were modestly correlated with higher recall of negative (r = .19, p = .10) than positive (r = .10,  
p = .39) phrases related to this domain, but the difference in strength between the correlations 
was nonsignificant, z = .57, p = .57. NSPS social competence scores were also modestly 
associated with higher recall of negative (r = .21, p = .07) than positive (r = -.12. p = .31) phrases 
related to this domain, with a significant difference between the strengths of these two 
correlations, z = 2.08, p =.04. Finally, NSPS physical appearance scores were not associated with 
recall of negative (r = 0.0. p = .99) phrases and were modestly correlated with positive phrases 
related to this domain (r = -.15. p = .19), with a nonsignificant difference in strength between the 










 The present study utilized a novel approach to investigate threat processing and memory 
biases in SA, in which high and low socially anxious participants viewed neutral faces associated 
at random with explicitly valenced phrases that represented positive or negative social feedback. 
Through the development of this paradigm, we attempted to improve upon the methodological 
shortcomings of previous work in this area of research by: (a) controlling for the distinctiveness 
of facial expressions across experimental stimuli; (b) directly manipulating the nature of the 
threat content of the social stimuli that participants encountered; and (c) measuring the extent to 
which idiosyncratic social concerns accounted for individual differences in the memorability of 
threatening versus non-threatening stimuli.  
 Like numerous previous studies, we failed to find support for the presence of a general 
memory bias among high SA participants, neither toward nor away from threat. However, our 
results did provide clear evidence in support of a positive expectancy bias for novel faces among 
low SA individuals, which high SA individuals appear to lack. Specifically, whereas low SA 
participants in our study appeared to give new social partners the benefit of the doubt, perceiving 
them as nice unless compelled otherwise, high SA participants did not. Thus, high SA 
individuals may enter novel social interactions with more negative and less positive 
expectancies, deciding a priori that potential interaction partners are about as likely to be mean as 
they are to be nice. Operating through the lens of this bias would clearly highlight the perceived 
likelihood and costs of negative social experiences for high SA individuals, thereby fueling 
symptoms of social anxiety.  
Our findings can be understood in the context of contemporary interpersonal and 
cognitive-behavioural models of SA. Interpersonal models (e.g., Alden & Taylor, 2004) stress 
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the centrality of maladaptive interpersonal cycles that become established between high SA 
individuals and their interaction partners, which ultimately perpetuate the likelihood of negative 
social outcomes. According to interpersonal models, high SA individuals, particularly those with 
negative early social experiences, possess more negative relational schemas (Taylor & Alden, 
2005), and may be more likely to view other people as being more critical, and less friendly, 
warm, and courteous than those without SA (e.g., Jones & Briggs, 1984; Leary, Kowalski, & 
Campbell, 1988). Moreover, according to cognitive-behavioral models (e.g., Clark & Well, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), one important factor in the maintenance of social anxiety 
symptoms is high SA individuals‘ tendency to overestimate the probability of negative social and 
interpersonal outcomes, a theoretical claim that has now been supported by several experimental 
studies (e.g., Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; McManus, Clark, & Hackmann, 2000; 
Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, & Telch, 2006; Taylor & Alden, 2008). Thus, the present study 
complements these previous findings by suggesting that high SA individuals tend to interpret 
novel, ambiguous faces as being mean, and to overestimate (when compared to low SA 
individuals) the likelihood of negative social outcomes when interacting with unfamiliar 
individuals. 
 An additional contribution of our study, and one that has not been adequately addressed 
in past research, is the potential role of individuals‘ idiosyncratic self-relevant concerns in the 
processing and memory of social threat. A very limited number of previous studies have 
explored personal salience of threat stimuli. As described above, for example, Cody and 
Teachman (2010) compared memory for feedback provided to participants and to others 
following a speech task, and found that the way feedback was remembered varied as a function 
of whether the feedback was related to one‘s own versus another person‘s speech performance. 
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One important form of idiosyncratic threat that has yet to be explored as a possible contributing 
factor to information processing biases in SA is that of perceived personal flaws. According to 
Moscovitch (2009), socially anxious individuals‘ self-portrayal concerns are generally focused 
on visible signs of anxiety, perceived social competence, and physical appearance, with concerns 
across these three non-orthogonal dimensions potentially accounting for individual differences in 
social anxiety symptoms across high SA individuals.  
 The NSPS (Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011) was recently designed to measure these self-
portrayal concerns. In the present study, the social feedback that participants received 
corresponded with NSPS items that measure characteristics across these three dimensions. Our 
findings do provide tentative support for the role of personal salience of threatening information 
in memory biases to threat, indicating marginally significant relations between signs of anxiety 
and social competence concerns (as measured on the NSPS) and subsequent recall of negative 
(but not positive) feedback related to these domains. While ours was the first study to examine 
the role of personally relevant self-portrayal concerns in memory for threatening social 
information, our ability to test the personal relevance hypothesis was constrained by the small 
number of negative and positive stimuli per NSPS dimension (n = 6 for each) that participants 
encountered and were thus able to later recall. Future studies focusing on this hypothesis should 
include more experimental stimuli to ensure that analyses are adequately powered. 
 Overall, the present study had several important strengths and a number of limitations. In 
terms of strengths, the methodological features of our paradigm (i.e., using neutral faces paired 
with explicit, rather than implicit, social feedback) enabled a stringent test of the memory bias 
hypothesis without the need to disentangle the effects of a possible memory bias from those of a 
response bias. Indeed, although some previous studies (Coles & Heimberg, 2005; Lundh & Öst, 
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1996) found that individuals with social anxiety disorder were more likely than non-anxious 
controls to recognize faces they had previously appraised as being threatening, Coles and 
Heimberg (2005) concluded that this pattern of results was primarily driven by a response bias to 
negative faces rather than by a memory bias per se, as described above. The use of neutral faces 
eliminates this important potential confound, and our results complement the conclusion reached 
by Coles and Heimberg. Specifically, Coles and Heimberg demonstrated that individuals high in 
SA, as compared to those low in SA, are biased to believe that critical faces have been 
previously encountered. Our findings suggest that similar biases in individuals high in SA also 
extend to future social interactions with new partners. Moreover, although the encoding task in 
the present study differs in many ways from real life social interaction, it was designed to 
enhance ecological validity by incorporating some of the features of genuine social encounters, 
which are arguably absent from the commonly used tasks that have relied on objectively 
valenced facial expressions. Indeed, as others have argued previously (e.g., Coles & Heimberg, 
2005), strongly and overtly negative facial expressions are rarely encountered outside the 
experimental setting and are even uncommon in expressions of negative social evaluation, in 
which ambiguous or, perhaps, subtly negative expressions are likely to predominate. Thus, 
results of the present study may be more generalizable to the way social information may be 
processed and remembered by socially anxious individuals who encounter familiar or unfamiliar 
neutral faces in real social contexts outside the laboratory, and must acquire positive or negative 
interpersonal associations. In this way, our findings complement other studies that have shown 
that high SA individuals tend to interpret ambiguous information in a negative manner, even 
when alternate, positive interpretations are available (e.g., Amir et al., 1998). 
33 
 
 In terms of limitations, this study investigated an analog sample of socially anxious 
university students and it will be important to replicate our findings in a clinical sample of 
community outpatients with social anxiety disorder. It would also have been informative to have 
included an anxious control group of participants with symptoms other than social anxiety to 
examine whether the differences between groups were due to differences in trait anxiety more 
generally or specific to social anxiety. In addition, the interesting and unexpected findings 
regarding the role of ethnicity in our primary findings raise new questions. Cross-cultural 
differences in the expression of social anxiety between Western and Eastern cultures is a small 
but growing area of research with intriguing implications, with some preliminary studies 
suggesting that cultural factors may play an important role in the prevalence, experience and 
expression of social anxiety. In particular, there is some suggestion indicating that individuals of 
ethnic minorities (e.g., East Asians) exhibit higher rates of social anxiety than Caucasians. 
However, certain behaviours commonly conceptualized as features of social anxiety, such as a 
pervasive desire to conform to social encounters and compromise one‘s own desires for the 
purpose of maintaining harmony, reflect Western values of autonomy and independence, and 
may be culturally valued tendencies in other cultures (e.g., Hong & Woody, 2007; Schreier et al., 
2010). Future hypothesis-driven studies are needed to better understand how and why Caucasian 
and Asian participants may differ in their expectancies of threat associated with novel social 
partners. Finally, while our study paradigm is more akin to social threat than those used in 
previous face processing studies, the use of a computerized task to assess biases related to social 
interactions is inevitably limited in ecological validity, as it lacks the dynamic interactions that 
characterize real-life social situations. To determine more conclusively what, if any, face 
processing biases exist in SA, future studies should employ methodological approaches that both 
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replicate social interaction as closely as experimentally possible and ensure that potential social 
costs of negative social outcomes (e.g., negative evaluation, rejection, etc.) are as realistic and 





In the present study, ethnicity was coded into three categories: Caucasian, Asian and 
Other. Given that our high SA and low SA groups represented different proportions of 
participants of different ethnicities, with a higher number of Asian participants in the high SA 
group, we wished to further investigate whether our main findings of interest - specifically, the 
lack of a positive expectancy bias in high SA participants - generalized across ethnicities. First, 
we re-ran our primary analysis of interest, examining the rates of participants rating correctly-
identified novel faces as mean vs. nice as a 2 (Group [low SA, high SA]) x 2 (Valence [Mean, 
Nice]) mixed-design analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with ethnicity entered as a covariate. 
This analysis yielded no significant main effects for valence, group, or ethnicity (Fs ≤ 3.69, ps ≥ 
.59). There were also no significant 2-way or 3-way interactions involving ethnicity (Fs ≤ 1.46, 
ps ≥ .21). However, once ethnicity was controlled for, the group x valence interaction previously 
outlined was no longer significant F(1,76) = 2.0, p = .16, indicating that ethnic differences were 
contributing substantially to the group x valence interaction.  
In order to better understand the role of ethnicity in moderating our findings of interest, 
we compared our two largest ethnic groups within the participant sample - Caucasians and 
Asians - in order to determine how to characterize the pattern of results within each group. We 
conducted two separate 2 (Group [low SA, high SA]) x 2 (Valence [Mean, Nice]) mixed-design 
ANOVAs on for the numbers of correctly-identified novel faces labelled mean vs. nice, first in 
Caucasian participants only and then in Asian participants only. Results indicated that the 
expectancy bias discussed above was driven primarily by the response patterns of Caucasian 
participants. For participants who identified as Caucasian, there was main effect of valence 
F(1,24) = 7.0, p = .01, as well as a marginally significant group by valence interaction in the 
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expected direction, F(1,24) = 3.37, p = .08. In contrast, for the Asian participants, neither effect 
was significant (Fs ≤ 2.41, p ≥ .13). This finding indicates that high and low socially anxious 
individuals of different ethnic backgrounds may differ substantially in the ways they approach 
novel social contacts. However, due to the varying numbers of Caucasian and Asian low and 
high SA participants in our study, we were underpowered in determining the nature of these 
differences. Future studies can address these differences by recruiting equal number of Asian and 
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Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on any statement. 
    0 = Did not apply to me at all 
    1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
    2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
    3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
1.  I found it hard to wind down  0 1 2 3 
 
2.   I was aware of dryness of my mouth   0 1 2 3 
 
3.  I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all  0 1 2 3 
 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing,         
 breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)  0 1 2 3 
 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things   0 1 2 3 
 
6. I tended to over-react to situations   0 1 2 3 
 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)    0 1 2 3 
 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy   0 1 2 3 
 
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and 
 make a fool of myself  0 1 2 3 
 
10.  I felt that I had nothing to look forward to   0 1 2 3 
 
11.   I found myself getting agitated   0 1 2 3 
 
12.  I found it difficult to relax    0 1 2 3 
 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue    0 1 2 3 
 
14.  I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on  
with what I was doing  0 1 2 3 
 
15.  I felt I was close to panic    0 1 2 3 
 




17.  I felt I wasn't worth much as a person   0 1 2 3 
 
18.  I felt that I was rather touchy     0 1 2 3 
 
19.  I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion  
          (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 0 1 2 3 
  
20.  I felt scared without any good reason  0 1 2 3 
 























Negative Self-Portrayal Scale 
 
According to the scale provided below, please write the number in the blank space beside each 
item to indicate the degree to which you are concerned about the following aspects of yourself 
when you are in anxiety-provoking social situations (e.g. talking to someone who is a stranger; 
giving a speech in front of an audience; answering a question in class; etc.). 
 
 1 ------------------- 2 ------------------- 3 ------------------- 4 ------------------- 5 
      Not at all  Slightly    Moderately              Very    Extremely 
     concerned            concerned            concerned           concerned   concerned 
 
 
In social situations (in which I feel anxious), it will become obvious to other people that I 
am: 
 
_____ 1.  stuttering         
_____ 2.  poorly dressed      
_____ 3.  boring      
_____ 4.  sweating      
_____ 5.  physically unattractive    
_____ 6.  losing control of my emotions     
_____ 7.  blushing      
_____ 8.  speaking with a trembling voice     
_____ 9.  blemished (i.e., my appearance)   
_____ 10.  interpersonally ineffective   
_____ 11.  weird-looking         
_____ 12.  lacking personality        
_____ 13.  fat        
_____ 14.  unable to express myself    
_____ 15.  twitching (i.e. my facial muscles)    
_____ 16.  frozen        
_____ 17.  humourless     
_____ 18.  reserved       
_____ 19.  aloof      
_____ 20.  stupid      
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_____ 21.  socially awkward     
_____ 22.  having a bad hair day     
_____ 23.  speaking incoherently    
_____ 24.  lacking social skills  
_____ 25.  fidgeting  
_____ 26.  unfashionable  






















Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) 
Please check how much the following problems have bothered you during the past week.  Mark only one box for 
each problem, and be sure to answer all items. 
 
  Not at all A little bit Somewhat Very 
much 
Extremely 
       
1. I am afraid of people in authority.      
       
2. I am bothered by blushing in front of people.      
       
3. Parties and social events scare me.      
       
4. I avoid talking to people I don‘t know.      
       
5. Being criticized scares me a lot.      
       
6. Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid 
doing things or speaking to people. 
     
       
7. Sweating in front of people causes me 
distress. 
     
       
8. I avoid going to parties.      
       
9. I avoid activities in which I am the centre of 
attention. 
     
       
10. Talking to strangers scares me.      
       
11. I avoid having to give speeches.      
       
12. I would do anything to avoid being 
criticized. 
     
       
13. Heart palpitations bother me when I am 
around people. 
     
       
14. I am afraid of doing things when people 
might be watching. 
     
       
15. Being embarrassed or looking stupid are 
among my worst fears. 
     
       
16. I avoid speaking to anyone in authority.      
       
17. Trembling or shaking in front of others is 
distressing to me. 
     
  
 






Free Recall Record Form 
SET 1: Please list as many of the comments that you can remember here from the preceding set: 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
 
SET 2: Please list as many of the comments that you can remember here from the preceding set: 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
 
SET 3: Please list as many of the comments that you can remember here from the preceding set: 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________ 
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 
 I can see that ___________________  
I can see that ___________________ 




















Loner -2.37 0.11 Mean Social Competence 
(Absentminded) -1.58 0.00 Mean Social Competence 
Anxious -0.89 0.42 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Apprehensive -0.47 0.05 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Awkward  -1.79 0.00 Mean Social Competence 
(Blemished) -2.05 0.05 Mean Physical Appearance 
Boring -2.68 0.11 Mean Social Competence 
Chubby -1.63 0.11 Mean Physical Appearance 
(Clumsy) -1.26 0.11 Mean Social Competence 
(Distant) -1.05 0.00 Mean Social Competence 
(Fat) -2.47 0.63 Mean Physical Appearance 
(Frumpy) -1.26 0.53 Mean Physical Appearance 
(Indifferent) -0.63 0.05 Mean Social Competence 
Introverted -0.21 0.21 Mean Social Competence 
Nervous -1.00 0.32 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
On edge -1.26 0.05 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Overweight -2.11 0.37 Mean Physical Appearance 
Plain -1.74 0.00 Mean Physical Appearance 
(Restless) -0.79 0.32 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
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Tense -0.89 0.16 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Ugly -2.74 0.32 Mean Physical Appearance 
Unattractive -2.53 0.26 Mean Physical Appearance 
Uneasy -1.21 0.37 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Unfriendly -2.42 0.21 Mean Social Competence 
Uptight -1.89 0.16 Mean Signs of Anxiety 
Big nose -1.95 0.32 Mean Physical Appearance 
Lack charisma -2.26 0.16 Mean Social Competence 
(Handsome) 2.21 0.00 Nice Physical Appearance 
Articulate 2.21 0.11 Nice Social Competence 
(At ease) 1.53 0.26 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
(At peace) 1.68 0.05 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
(Attractive) 2.32 0.84 Nice Physical Appearance 
Calm 1.16 0.32 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
(Charismatic) 2.16 0.37 Nice Social Competence 
(Clear skin) 1.32 0.00 Nice Physical Appearance 
(Comfortable) 1.58 0.16 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Composed 1.37 0.05 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Confident 2.21 0.42 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Fit 2.16 0.32 Nice Physical Appearance 
Friendly 2.16 0.53 Nice Social Competence 
Good-looking 2.16 0.11 Nice Physical Appearance 
Interesting 1.68 0.11 Nice Social Competence 
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(Kind) 2.11 0.05 Nice Social Competence 
Likeable 1.89 0.16 Nice Social Competence 
(Motivated) 2.00 0.05 Nice Social Competence 
Pleasant 1.58 0.11 Nice Social Competence 
Poised 1.53 0.37 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Relaxed 1.21 0.42 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Self-assured 1.32 0.16 Nice Signs of Anxiety 
Slim 1.21 0.42 Nice Physical Appearance 
Sociable 1.84 0.26 Nice Social Competence 
Attractive face 2.05 0.05 Nice Physical Appearance 
Beautiful eyes 2.53 0.37 Nice Physical Appearance 
Great hair 2.32 0.42 Nice Physical Appearance 
 
Note. Bolded descriptors were ultimately chosen as the stimuli for the present study, while those 
in parentheses were the stimuli that were piloted but not used in this study. 
 
